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During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, a significant 
indigenous resistance movement, the Patriots Movement, 
emerged. The nature and impact of this resistance is 
reconsidered by highlighting aspects of its role in 
‘redefining Ethiopia’, its internal policy and its position in 
the global community after the start of the Second World 
War. The resistance movement was based on the ideals of 
restoring national independence and preserving cultural 
identity. There is also discussion of the reasons for the 
abrupt end to the resistance – mainly due to an external 
intervening factor (the British army) and the defeat of Italy – 
which prevented the challenge posed by the resistance 
movement and its incipient ideas of political reform being 
taken up seriously by the post-war imperial regime.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1935, Ethiopia, until that time a traditional polity with a predominantly 
feudal political system, was invaded by the industrialized nation of Italy under 
the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini. In defiance of the ensuing occupation, 
Ethiopians became involved in a multi-dimensional ‘patriotic resistance’ to 
drive the invaders out of their country, fighting against many odds, including 
indifference from the League of Nations and the West. It lasted for five years, 
                                                 
 The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor J. Abbink for his advice and 
comments on this chapter. 
88 Aregawi   
while the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, was engaged in a largely fruitless 
diplomatic struggle from exile. 
This chapter explains the resistance that was launched to counter the Italian 
occupation in Ethiopia, reconsiders the nature and impact of the resistance, and 
highlights aspects that ‘redefined Ethiopia’, its internal policy and its position in 
the global community following the beginning of the Second World War. The 
chapter has three sections. The first part is a condensed narrative of the 
occupation itself and the resistance it triggered. In the second part I look into the 
historical, religious and traditional values that drew numerous people together 
in resistance and discuss the actual resistance as it unfolded. Finally, I consider 
how the resistance came to an abrupt end because of external intervention, 
without which it would probably have continued for as long as the invaders 
could have clung on to the ancient nation. The challenge the movement posed to 
the post-war Ethiopian imperial state is also discussed. 
 
 
The Italian occupation of Ethiopia 
 
The Italians under Benito Mussolini were determined to have Ethiopia as their 
colony and make it pay for the humiliating defeat it had inflicted upon them at 
the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when a modern Italian army under four generals 
was crushed in one morning. Some years before, on 25 January 1887 at Dogali, 
12 kilometres from the port of Massawa on the way to Asmara, an Ethiopian 
force under the command of Ras1 Alula Ingida, the governor of the region then 
known as Mereb-Mellash, had destroyed another invading Italian army. As the 
historian Alberto Sbacchi remarked, that was ‘the first major setback received 
by any European power at the hands of an African army’.2 The 1896 Italian 
defeat at Adwa, however, sent a shock wave to Rome that lingered right up until 
the invasion of 1935. Italy had, during this time, been contemplating a 
comeback to maintain its colonial interests amid competition from France and 
Britain in the scramble for East Africa. 
‘As early as 1925, Mussolini gave orders for military preparation with a 
view of waging war against Ethiopia, but not until 1934 did plans for the 
conquest of Ethiopia receive his full attention. The preparation involved huge 
sums of money, and quantities of trucks, tanks, artillery, airplanes, and 
                                                 
1 Traditional Ethiopian titles denote military as well as civilian administration rankings. 
A ras is a chief of a region, under the emperor, and the head of a regional army. 
2 A. Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience 
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stockpiling of poison gas, to ensure Italy’s military superiority.’3 In fact, ‘De 
Bono’s two visits to Eritrea in 1932 were more of military reconnaissance than 
a simple tour of inspection by the Minister for the Colonies’.4 The Wälwäl 
incident of 5 December 1934, when Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed inside 
Ethiopian territory over the line of the frontier was not the actual cause of the 
Italian invasion. Mussolini’s fervour for a major onslaught on Ethiopia to build 
a greater empire became obvious ‘when he proclaimed that he was ready to 
declare war on Great Britain and France rather than give up the conquest of 
Ethiopia’.5 Content with their victory at Adwa, the Ethiopians now had to face 
one of the most serious offensives in their history.  
The springboard for the invasion was the land along the Red Sea coast that 
the Italians colonized 45 years before the 1936 invasion and which they had 
named Eritrea on 1 January 1890. Within two years, the final preparation for the 
conquest of Ethiopia was completed under the trusteeship of Marshal Emilio De 
Bono, the Commissioner of Colonies, who was sent to lead the invasion as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, with nine divisions of 250,000 
white combatants and 150,000 Africans from Libya, Italian Somaliland and 
Eritrea, collectively called askaris. Supported by 300 aircraft under his direct 
command, he had to advance from Asmara southwards into the hinterland of 
Ethiopia. On the southern front, one division with 100 aircraft, under Marshal 
Rodolfo Graziani, was deployed to head northwards. The plan was to converge 
on Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, within the shortest possible time, 
so that pressure from the League of Nations, of which Ethiopia had been a 
member since 1923, for a negotiated settlement could be avoided.  
The Ethiopian army, on the other hand, was estimated to have fewer than 
300,000 men, mobilized by regional rases or princes whose horizontal 
relationship with each other was undefined and in many cases competitive, but 
who usually stood united when foreign enemies threatened to invade. Emperor 
Haile Selassie, Commander-in-Chief of the national army, experienced a lack of 
modern means of communication that thwarted his establishing a centralized 
command to coordinate the war of defence in the mountainous regions. 
Tactically, this was an outstanding advantage for the invaders who were to 
coordinate and concentrate their forces as the situation demanded. There was 
also the problem of armaments. ‘The Ethiopian army was equipped with 200 
pieces of light artillery, 1000 machine guns and rifles with 150 rounds per 
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person.’6 Logistics were self-supplied except for small ammunition and hand 
grenades that were provided only sporadically. With the few exceptions of those 
who had travelled abroad, Ethiopians had not even seen armoured vehicles, 
tanks or bomber aircraft before. What brought them together to confront the 
mighty enemy was a strong self-image of national pride and patriotism, a love 
of freedom vis-à-vis foreigners, and specific ideals of human dignity they had 
nurtured through a long history of nationhood. The determination to remain 
independent and defend their specific cultural and religious values was 
manifested in their prayers, folk music and war songs, carried through the war 
and the resistance that followed. 
Early in October 1935 the Italians made a rapid advance towards Adwa, 
which was 30 kilometres from the colonial frontier that divided Eritrea and 
Tigray, the northern region of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian forces at Adwa were not 
only outnumbered but also could not withstand the long-range shelling of the 
howitzers, the deadly machine guns on the tanks and the bombs raining down 
from the air. The weapons they possessed were no match for modern Italian 
armaments. Before any serious engagement, they were ordered to withdraw in 
order to save their forces for a well-planned defensive manoeuvre deep in the 
country. On 6 October 1935, Adwa fell into Italian hands. Its seizure gave the 
invaders some psychological relief from the humiliating defeat they had 
suffered at Dogali and Adwa in 1887 and 1896 respectively, yet for those at the 
front, the war was just beginning and De Bono decided to advance with caution. 
A month later, on 8 November 1935, Mekele, the capital of the province of 
Tigray, came under the control of the Italians. Mussolini, who was infuriated by 
the slow pace of the campaign, replaced De Bono with Marshal Pietro Badoglio, 
who was Chief of Staff of the Italian army. Following instructions from Rome, 
Badoglio resorted to harsh military tactics to score a quick victory, including the 
dropping from the air of mustard-gas bombs over Ethiopian troops and civilian 
areas, even though mustard gas had been banned in 1925 by the Geneva Gas 
Protocol, to which Ethiopia and Italy were signatories. Thousands perished. 
Despite fire and air superiority and the use of mustard gas, the Ethiopian 
rebels and resistance fighters, who came to be known as ‘Patriots’ (locally 
known as Arbegnoch), began to regroup in their respective districts under their 
local leaders to confront the enemy. A series of major battles was waged over a 
period of three months: 15 December 1935 at Shiré and Enda-Baguna; 20-24 
January 1936 at Worsege-Tembien; 27-29 February at Workamba and Abiadi-
Tembien; 1-3 March at Selekhlekha; and in the second week of March at Emba 
Aradom and all the way to Alage. The battles were intense and the 
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determination of the Ethiopians was tested against all odds. In his 
autobiography the Emperor later wrote: ‘Although the Italians were superior to 
us in modern arms, our soldiers had the advantage in terms of courage. While 
our soldiers, who had won the battles in the Tambien and Shiré regions, were 
fighting with obsolete rifles like the Fusil Gras, they yet managed to capture 
more than 300 machine-guns and many cannons and tanks.’7 (Marshal 
Badoglio, on the other hand, estimated the number of Italian casualties in the 
Shire region alone as follows: ‘Our losses, including dead and wounded, were: 
63 officers, 894 Italians, 12 Eritreans. The losses of the enemy as ascertained on 
the field were about 4,000; to these must be added those inflicted by aircraft 
during the pursuit, the total of which was estimated at over 3,000.’8) This 
battlefront in the district of Shiré was just one of the several fronts in Tigray and 
was lead by Ras Imru, Governor of Gojjam Province, who later retreated to 
Gore in southwest Ethiopia. Virtually the whole of Tigray became a 
battleground for six consecutive months. 
Finally, on 31 March 1936 at Maichew and Lake Ashangé, the Emperor’s 
main force put up tenacious resistance but at the end of the day the Ethiopians 
were forced to retreat further south towards Dessie, the provincial capital of 
Wollo. Dessie fell into the hands of the Italians on 4 April 1936 after three days 
of long and bloody fighting. Unable to regroup and launch a counter-offensive, 
the Emperor and his remaining forces headed for Addis Ababa. The Battle of 
Maichew where the Emperor had assembled his best forces, eventually turned 
out to be the end of the conventional confrontation and the beginning of the 
Patriots’ resistance movement, which in fact seemed to have already started 
behind enemy lines.  
On the southern and southeastern fronts, however, the fighting remained 
intense with the forces of Ras Desta, Dejazmach9 Nesibu and Dejazmach 
Mekonnen, the governors of Sidamo, Harar and Illubabor regions respectively, 
deterring the northward movement of Marshal Graziani, who had vowed to 
deliver Ethiopia to Mussolini ‘with the Ethiopians or without them’.10 
Graziani’s wild statement was a reflection of Italy’s intended policy of 
resettling its overcrowded farmers on the fertile lands of Ethiopia. Not content 
with showering the Ethiopians with mustard gas, Graziani also resorted to the 
massacre of non-combatant villagers, for example, during battles in the Ogaden 
in 1936. At this time, about 900 Eritrean askaris, appalled by such Italian war 
                                                 
7 Haile Selassie I, The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I: My Life and 
Ethiopia’s Progress 1892-1937, translated and annotated by E. Ullendorff, (Oxford, 
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9 A dejazmach is a duke or commander of the front. 
10 A. Del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941 (Chicago, 1969), 113. 
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tactics, deserted to the Ethiopian side, thus testing the loyalty of the other 
colonial soldiers. Previously, in mid-December 1935, 400 Eritreans had already 
joined Ras Imru’s forces on the Shiré front.11 These desertions revealed the 
sympathy that many Eritreans felt for the Ethiopian and anti-colonial cause. 
While Graziani was contained on the southeastern front, Emperor Haile 
Selassie was unable to check Badoglio who was advancing from the north. The 
Emperor retreated from Dessie and entered Addis Ababa on the morning of 30 
April 1936, only to leave again two days later on his way into exile. On 5 May 
1936 Addis Ababa fell into the hands of the invaders without any resistance but 
amid chaos and looting triggered by the Emperor’s departure. 
The day the Emperor arrived in his capital, he hastily convened an assembly 
of his ministers and nobles. Two important agreements were immediately 
reached: (a) the Emperor had to go abroad to present Ethiopia’s case to the 
League of Nations; and (b) the seat of government had to move to Gore, 
southwest of Addis Ababa, and Bitweded12 Wolde-Tsadik Goshu should act as 
regent. While the first decision called for a diplomatic and political struggle, the 
second in effect meant the launch of a resistance movement against the Italian 
conquest, and was aimed at regaining independence. Many of the younger 
Patriots, aware of the ensuing authority gap caused by the Emperor’s absence, 
did not approve of his departure into exile. ‘Even the young Crown Prince had 
been suggesting to his own followers – to Dejazmach Fikremariam and 
Dejazmach Gurassu – that he should abandon his father and go with them as 
shifta to the hills’.13 But as the decision of the Emperor could not be contested, 
the resistance or shiftinnet (‘banditry’) had to commence without him. 
 
 
Resistance 
 
Historical background to Ethiopian nationhood 
Although strictly speaking beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief sketch of 
important moments in Ethiopia’s history is provided here in order to better 
grasp the essence of the resistance, as it was nurtured by strong notions of 
nationhood and cultural identity among large sectors of the population. 
The recorded history of Ethiopia as a state dates from the third century when 
it was known as the Kingdom of Aksum. Around 340 AD the Aksumite kings 
adopted Orthodox Christianity, which quickly became the religion of the 
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inhabitants and provided the symbolism and substance of the royal ideology. 
They also developed literary works, commerce through the ports of Adulis and 
Zeila, and the minting of coins. The empire gradually expanded over the 
Ethiopian highlands.  
The expansion of Islam after the seventh century led to a loss of international 
trade routes and revenue for Aksum and a decline in its regional power. In the 
tenth century, a revolt by Queen Yodit of the Agew people further to the south 
led to the demise of the Aksum state. The kingship was reconstituted by the 
Christian Zagwe dynasty located in the Agew country (in the tenth to thirteenth 
centuries). In the thirteenth century, the Ethiopian state, now located further to 
the south, was revived on the basis of a restyled Aksumite royal ideology. Not 
long afterwards however, the expansion of Islam from the north (from the 
Ottoman Empire) and the assault of Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi in 
1527-1543 dealt another devastating blow to the Ethiopian Christian empire, its 
population, resources, religious culture and architecture. After Ahmed’s defeat 
in 1543 it recovered only slowly. Then the Oromo migrations from the south 
brought another challenge by forcing a periodic shift of the political centre and 
a transformation of central Ethiopia’s civilization. The gradual loss of 
dynamism of the centralized state in turn gave rise to the emergence of local 
kings and princes who were often entangled in violent rivalry for supremacy 
(1760-1855).  
In 1855 the powerful Emperor Tewodros II (who reigned from 1855-1868) 
introduced the vision of a unified and modern Ethiopia. He managed to set up 
some semblance of a central state and collected royal revenues from the Amhara 
and Tigray regions. While challenging the encroachment of the Egyptians in the 
coastal area, Tewodros at the same time came into conflict with the British 
when he took hostage and locked up a number of European missionaries. The 
British sent an expeditionary force in 1868 and besieged his mountain fortress 
of Maqdala, where Tewodros, encircled by the British and with his offers of 
negotiation refused, chose to take his own life on 10 April 1868 rather than 
surrender to the invader. After a brief interlude he was succeeded by Emperor 
Yohannes (who reigned from 1872-1889) who had to fight against the 
Egyptians and later the Italians in the north. In the late 1880s he fought the 
invading Sudanese Mahdists in western Ethiopia, where he finally died at the 
Battle of Metemma in 1889. His successor, Emperor Menilik (who reigned from 
1889-1913), was a strong, modernizing leader who defeated the Italians at 
Adwa in 1896. To challenge the unbridled ambition of the foreign invaders, he 
was fully engaged in competition with France, Italy and Great Britain to expand 
territorial influence in the Horn of Africa, incorporating a large number of 
previously autonomous regions into the empire. The last of the emperors, Haile 
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Selassie (who reigned from 1930-1974) also had to fight invasion. He saw 
defeat (in 1936) and success (in 1941) while fighting Italian invaders.  
These last four emperors maintained a similar vision of creating a unified 
modern Ethiopia, and attempted to impose new ideas of loyalty and national 
identity on a dispersed and diverse population. The effects of this long history 
of struggle against a series of invaders created a sense of identity and pride 
associated with ancient historical referents based on political glory and religion, 
not only among the elite but also among the common people.  
 
The resistance begins 
By the time the Italian army had Addis Ababa under its control and Mussolini 
had declared Ethiopia part of the Italian Empire on 9 May 1936, only a section 
of the northern part of the country was firmly under their control. Sbacchi14 
observed that: ‘Five months after the defeat of Emperor Haile Selassie, 
Badoglio and Graziani controlled only one third of the country’. After the Battle 
of Maichew, resistance commenced more or less immediately. Many groups 
from the defeated army went into the bush and started resistance actions. 
Throughout the occupation period these Patriots remained active and made life 
difficult for the Italians, especially in rural northern, eastern and central 
Ethiopia. The country was thus never effectively occupied or colonized. For our 
purposes in this chapter it is also important to realize that during the struggle, 
which began as a ‘defense of the motherland’, new conceptions of politics and 
governance for Ethiopia emerged with and during the ongoing struggle. 
Although Mussolini exerted repeated pressure on his marshals on the 
frontlines to demonstrate a swift and profound victory over Ethiopia so that his 
rivals (Britain and France) would recognize Italy’s might, the progress made by 
his modern army remained slow as a result of the resistance it encountered. In 
the years that followed, the Italians were challenged in many a gorge, hill, 
mountain and village by units of Ethiopian Patriots. 
For many Ethiopians, the occupation of their land and the subsequent flight 
of their Emperor into exile meant the loss of their dignity and identity as a 
nation. It also meant the threat to or destruction of their traditional values and 
institutions, and more importantly the disruption of their history of which they 
were proud. The common motto at the time became ‘Tenes! atenesam woy, 
Hager sewrer zim telaleh woy’ (‘Rise up! Oh rise up, you cannot sit there when 
the country is invaded’). In connection with this motto, Haddis Alemayehu, in 
his book of personal recollections entitled Tezeta, gives a list of poems, poetic 
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calls and war songs, like Bälew attilim woy! Tekur anbesa aydellehim woy (Get 
him, aren’t you a black lion?).15 
During the 1935-1936 war, behind the lines declared ‘liberated’ by the 
Italians, hundreds of Patriots emerged in their respective localities to wage a 
war of resistance in defiance of the occupation. While conventional battles were 
raging in central and southeastern Ethiopia, Tigray, the first province to be 
occupied in northern Ethiopia, became the first battleground for the Patriots. 
They operated in small groups, not far from their respective localities. 
Dejazmach Gebrehiwet Mesheha, Dejazmach Abbai Kahsay, Dejazmach Tesfay 
Medebai, Fitawrari16 Tessema Tesfay, Dejazmach Gizaw, Dejazmach Taffere, 
Agafari17 Birru, Kassa Sibhat, Kegnazmach18 Aberra Adale and on the women’s 
side Woizero19 Kebedech Seyoum and Woizero Desta Gebre-Mikael were some 
of the prominent resistance leaders operating independently from Adwa in the 
north of Tigray to Maichew in the south of the province. They were engaged in 
activities such as the ambushing of enemy troops to acquire arms and other war 
materials, snowballing huge rocks off mountains and cliffs when enemy 
convoys passed, disrupting the enemy’s communication systems by kidnapping 
their messengers and later cutting telephone lines, setting fire to anything under 
enemy control such as offices and fuel or ammunition depots by firing from 
long range, and harassing and killing enemy collaborators. 
As the activities of the Patriots in Tigray escalated, the Italians began 
deploying more detachments, depleting their main force pushing southwards. 
The Patriots, now referred to as shifta by the Italians, were liable to be hunted 
down. The word shifta can be translated as ‘bandit’ or ‘outlaw’, but in the 
traditional Ethiopian context the concept of shifta was much broader than what 
the Italians wanted it to mean. To be a shifta meant to rebel against someone in 
authority or against an institution that had failed to render justice. To become a 
shifta was also generally accepted as a means of bringing grievances to the 
attention of the people in order to gain sympathy when higher authorities had 
failed to deliver justice or rights customarily due. Usually a shifta emerged from 
the noble classes and had some form of wider, critical vision on the social order 
that enabled him/her to express, in words or in action, real or perceived 
injustices and responses to the situation. The commitment to deliver justice that 
was initially denied is embedded in the concept of shifta, although a shifta may 
him/herself not necessarily be free from wrongdoing. Thus shiftinnet (being a 
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shifta) in its diverse forms had an important social function and was one form of 
‘conflict resolution’.20 
In Ethiopia, visionary and assertive individuals who started as shifta had 
risen to the level of kingship, thus legitimizing the concept of shifta itself. Two 
late nineteenth-century shiftas, Kassa Hailu of Gondar and Kahsai Mircha of 
Tigray, had passed through this political evolution to become Emperors 
Tewodros and Yohannes in succession. Thus ‘the shiftas formed the military 
elite and became the core of the resistance, using their military skills against the 
Italians’.21 A shifta, however, whose acts surpassed the socially acceptable 
norms would be called t’era-shifta and would be regarded as a highwayman or a 
malefactor and be denied the affection of the people. The Italians 
understandably preferred to label the Patriots t’era-shiftas of the criminal type. 
Nevertheless, to be described as a shifta, especially in the event of Italian 
occupation, was an honour for an Ethiopian and this was how resistance started 
and spread. A commonly sung lyrical poem in the region at that time went:  
 
Adi tefiu, adi’do yewaal’ye, 
Beti Hatsur akiblini meneshiraye, 
Ne’merebey iye ne’merebey! 
 
In a lost country, you cannot stay a day, 
Through the fence, throw me the gun, 
I should go to Merebe, oh my Merebe!22 
 
There were many such popular songs, which were in effect traditional calls 
for resistance before the official call came. Officially, though, on 9 December 
1935, the Ethiopian Minister of War, Ras Mulugeta Yigezu, issued an order to 
all the chiefs of northern Ethiopia to carry on with ‘patriotic resistance against 
the Italians for taking away the independence of Ethiopia’.23 
While a guerrilla war, which had basically been the tactics of the shifta, was 
underway in the north in 1936 where the enemy had assumed full control, 
conventional battles were still raging in the centre, particularly around Addis 
                                                 
20 T. Fernyhough, ‘Social Mobility and Dissident Elites in Northern Ethiopia: The Role 
of Banditry, 1900-1969’, in ‘Proceedings of the Symposium on Rebellion and Social 
Protest in Africa’, April 22-24, African Studies Program, University of Illinois 
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21 A. Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941 
(Lawrenceville, N.J., 1997), 182. 
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could launch attacks on the enemy. 
23 Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness, 165. 
  
 Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia 97 
Ababa and to the south. After the defeat of the Emperor’s troops at Maichew 
and the fall of Addis Ababa to the Italians on 5 May 1936, the rases, 
dejazmaches and all other notables withdrew to their respective areas but were 
within close range of Addis Ababa. They were based in familiar and strategic 
villages to recover from the exhaustion of eight months of war, and to 
reorganize their forces for the next phase of the patriotic fight. These villages 
were logistically well situated, in that the leaders were able to follow events in 
the capital that might cause them to launch attacks. Ras Abebe Aregay was in 
Ankober, Dejazmach Balcha Safo in Gurage land, Dejazmach Zewdu Asfaw in 
Mullo, Blatta24 Takele Wolde-Hawariat in Limmu, the Ras Kassa brothers 
(Aberra, Asfaw-Wosen and Wond-Wosen) in Selale, and Haile Mariam Mamo 
was engaged in hit-and-run tactics around the city. With more than 10,000 
troops, Aberra, the son of Ras Kassa (who had accompanied the Emperor into 
exile) had been entrusted by the Emperor to coordinate the resistance in that 
region, which he was doing his best to accomplish. On 21 June 1936, for 
instance, he held a meeting of some Patriotic leaders, including the Patriarch of 
Wollo, Abune25 Petros, at Debre Libanos, the renowned monastery dating from 
1312 and located some 70 kilometres north of Addis Ababa. They made a plan 
to storm enemy-occupied areas in the capital but a lack of effective means of 
transportation and radio communication prevented a coordinated assault from 
taking place. Sporadic attacks by the different groups continued, however, to 
dominate the battle scene around Addis Ababa.  
Goré, in southeastern Ethiopia, the seat of the displaced government run by 
the elder regent, Bitweded Wolde-Tsadik Goshu, was far from within easy reach 
and never became effective in providing nationwide leadership to the resistance 
movement. The rases and governors had to do without the Emperor who was 
considered both the legitimate leader and an able commander. Indeed for many, 
the unexpected departure of the authoritative Emperor into exile had created a 
gap nobody seemed able to fill. The few rases, like Imru in Wollega and Desta 
in Sidamo, who had made the long retreat from the defeat in the north to the 
south near Goré, could neither realize effective mobility nor acquire the 
resources to keep their troops intact. But from a distance of hundreds of 
kilometres, their holding out and acts of defiance helped to inspire others to 
resist. Thus, they were capable of continuously ‘distracting the Italians’ mind 
and attention’.26  
                                                 
24 A blatta is the chief of staff, and an executive at the court. 
25 The Abun is the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 
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Early on, as information about the coordinated attack on Addis Ababa 
reached the Italians, they encircled the city with barbed wire and 38 cement 
forts. People and traffic could come into the city only through ten gates.27 This 
was indicative of the need for precautions against resistance activity. In general, 
as conventional warfare had proved ineffective in the face of the modern Italian 
conventional army, the need to resist the enemy in another form emerged. 
 
The spread of resistance 
The prospect of conventional war gradually faded but the spirit of resistance 
persisted. A different attitude of defiance and ways of attacking began to 
surface from many quarters. Virtually the entire membership of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Women’s Volunteer Service Association 
(EWVSA) and the Black Lion Organization, as well as many other small groups 
of individuals, appeared in the forefront of the resistance. Their activities ranged 
from direct assaults on top Italian leaders to providing all-round underground 
support to the Patriots in the villages and mountains. 
The Orthodox Church, which was historically an integral part of the 
Ethiopian state, began to play a pivotal role in broadening the dimensions of the 
resistance. The Church took it as an everyday obligation, inside and outside the 
church, to renounce the incursion of Italian invaders in a free country with a 
sovereign state. Passages from the Bible were frequently cited to invoke 
national sentiment and loyalty. The verse ‘Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands 
unto God’28 was recited in daily prayers. It was interpreted to mean that 
Ethiopia deserved all the rights of a free nation as recognized by the Almighty, 
and the Christian world should stand by its side. Guided by such a deep-rooted 
belief, Abune Petros, the Bishop of Wollo, marched through the streets of Addis 
Ababa denouncing the Italian occupation and calling on the people to keep 
fighting for independence. Many people came out of their houses to support 
him. However he was soon apprehended and on 30 July 1936 executed by firing 
squad in a public square, where his statue now stands.  
The killing of a bishop was unheard of in Ethiopia and shocked the nation, 
arousing the indignation of the people, especially the clergy. Defiance of Italian 
rule was mounting in different forms but such reactions did not stop the Italians 
who proceeded to execute monks, priests and deacons in many monasteries and 
churches, expecting submission. ‘On 21 May 1937, General P. Maletti had 
executed in the monastery of Debre Libanos alone 297 monks’.29 Five days 
later, more priests and deacons were massacred in the nearby church of Debre  
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Kebedech Seyoum, a female Patriot, c. 1935  
Source: Nega Tegegn, Ye’Ethiopiawiyan 
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Birhan, other executions and repression followed elsewhere. Yet the numerous 
monasteries and churches of Ethiopia continued to be centres of resistance and 
propaganda and to offer sanctuary to the Patriots. 
The participation of women in the resistance was crucial. It is difficult to 
estimate their real military contribution but their supplementary support 
activities, spying and sabotage actions in some instances were decisive. 
Historically, women had been active participants in previous wars defending the 
country. Not long before, Empress Taytu and her husband Emperor Menilik had 
marched to the battlefront in Adwa in 1896 and played an important role in 
bringing about the defeat of the Italians. Chris Prouty reports that Taytu had 
organized thousands of women, including Zewditu, her step daughter and later 
empress (1916-1928), and Azalech, her cousin, and strengthened the defence 
lines by supplying water and taking care of the wounded.30 She was also a 
military tactician whose participation had helped to bring about the defeat of the 
Italians at the Battle of Mekele a month before the Battle of Adwa.31 Ethiopian 
women had, thus, a reputation to uphold in defending the national cause.32 
Woizero Shawaragad Gadle had turned the EWVSA, which was under the 
patronage of Princess Tenagne-Work, daughter of the Emperor, into a 
clandestine movement of resistance. The women in this association were 
involved in scores of activities, ranging from supplying bandages, clothes and 
ammunition bought or stolen from Italian troops to the Patriots in the field, to 
giving shelter and forging pass papers for the active Patriots to travel inside 
enemy-controlled territory. Some of the women gathered military intelligence 
and a few even planned military operations. It was Shawaragad Gadle ‘who laid 
the groundwork for the storming of the Italian garrison at Addis Alem’.33 It was 
during this time that the term Yewist Arbegna (clandestine Patriot) was coined.  
In the countryside not only did women prepare quanta (dried meat), qollo 
(roasted cereals), besso (instant cereal powder) and various foodstuffs that may 
be compared to ‘dry rations’ in modern military jargon but also sharpened 
swords and shuttled between the zones of operation and their houses. According 
to G. Tafere’s dramatized description, they also ‘sent down from various slopes 
avalanches of stones, not heeding the shower of bombs that were coming down 
from the air, and women like Woizero Fantaye actually fought on the 
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battlefields’.34 In her documentary study, Salome Gebre-Egziabher35 provides a 
list of 64 women patriots in the resistance movement and also gave the names 
of prominent Patriots from every region, including hundreds from Eritrea. 
It was customary for married couples and young boys to join the resistance 
army and often find themselves far away from their homes for years. ‘When 
Dejazmach Habtemariam was too sick to lead the battles in Ogaden in April 
1936, his wife, equally a Patriot, took over commanding his troops’.36 ‘Woizero 
Wagaye and her husband Lij37 Bitew, the secretary of Ras Imru, have been 
together all the way from the northern front of Shire to the southern front in 
Wollega and many other married couples too were participating continuously in 
the patriotic resistance.’38 John Spencer adds to the list of prominent women 
freedom fighters, ‘Kebedech Seyoum, Qelemework Tilahun, Sliva Reyed 
Gadle, Laqetch Demissew, Qonjit Abinet, Likelesh Beyene and Abebech 
Cherkos’.39 Gessesew Ayele joined the resistance force at the age of 14 and 
fought on the southern front. 
In Addis Ababa, a group called the Black Lion Organization was formed, 
composed of young intellectuals from various schools and colleges including 
the recently established Holetta Military College. Some of its prominent leaders 
included Dr Alemwork Beyene, a veterinary surgeon, Yilma Deressa, a 
graduate of the London School of Economics, Belay Haile-Ab and Kifle 
Nesibu, both Holetta graduates, and Fekade-Selassie Hiruy and the Workeneh 
brothers, three of them British-educated. Their aim was much broader than any 
other group in the resistance, their organization had a constitution and they were 
poised to undertake urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Their constitution 
reflected their political motivation and commitment, and their programme also 
referred to the period that would follow a successful resistance.  
According to Taddasa, ‘among the most striking features of the constitution 
[of the Black Lion Organization] were: the affirmation of the supremacy of 
political over military command, the provision for the human treatment of 
prisoners and the non-molestation of the peasantry, the prohibition of exile, and 
the injunction of suicide rather than capture by the enemy’.40  
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Detachments of this group engaged the enemy in and outside the city in 
various forms. One of their most spectacular actions was the burning of three 
planes in the night of 26 June 1936 in Bonaya, Neqemte, when twelve out of the 
thirteen Italian officials present were also killed, including the Italian Deputy 
Viceroy to Ethiopia, Air Marshall Magliocco. The only survivor was Father M. 
Borello whose role was to guide and give a blessing to the short-lived Italian 
expedition in the southwest, undertaken to exploit Oromo discontent towards 
the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian state and pave the way for expansion through 
Dejazmach Habte-Mariam of Neqemte, who had shown signs of collaboration 
some days earlier. This indicates that by no means all Ethiopians in all regions 
unequivocally supported the Patriots’ resistance. Many were even ignorant of 
such a movement in central Ethiopia. While negotiations in Neqemte were 
underway, ‘the daring assault on the Italian high ranking officials was 
performed by four members of the Black Lion Organisation, namely Colonel 
Belay Haile-Ab, Major Matias Gemeda, Captain Yosef Nesibu and Captain 
Benyam Nesibu, who returned safely to their unit’.41 This operation infuriated 
Graziani and led him to order a blanket bombardment of Neqemte and its 
environs. History books refer to it as the Neqemte Massacre, a massacre in 
which hundreds of people of all ages were killed and wounded. Thus, what 
initially seemed to be a successful expedition for the Italians in an area thought 
to be sympathetic to Italian rule ended in disaster.  
However, the impact of the bombardment and the negative attitude of the 
people in the region forced most of the Patriots to abandon the area in search of 
a more favourable one, while the older Patriots began retiring to remote places. 
Ras Desta Damtew, the son-in-law of Emperor Haile Selassie and Commander 
of the Southern Patriots, withdrew to Arbagoma but was encircled by three 
columns of Italian infantry under General Navarrini. After days of fighting, Ras 
Desta escaped to Eya, Butajira where he was captured and executed by firing 
squad shortly afterwards. The Italians estimated Ethiopian losses in these battles 
at 4,000 of whom 1,600 were executed by firing squad.42 The Italians thought 
that the defeat and later the execution of Ras Desta would kill the fervour of the 
resistance but this proved to be wrong, as more people were moving to support 
the Patriots. 
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Acts of collaboration 
 
The Italians found a few collaborators among the Ethiopian nobility, not so 
much due to mere opportunism but largely because of their ambitions and 
claims to power, for which the Italians might be a stepping stone. Although 
superior force was the ultimate means upon which the Italians relied to execute 
their invasion and sustain their occupation of Ethiopia, they had been looking 
for collaborators ever since they began preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia. 
Their long stay in nearby Eritrea had helped them to study, contact and recruit 
collaborators in Ethiopia. They had focused on three elements of contradiction 
that might be manipulated within Ethiopian society: rivalry among the different 
contending (regional) leaders; traditional Christian-Muslim tensions; and the 
resentment of the southern Ethiopian people towards the central government for 
its unfair appropriation of their lands since the late nineteenth century. Initially, 
these contradictions seemed to facilitate the occupation, but with the spread of 
the resistance and the Italians treating collaborators as unreliable servants, they 
did not prove sufficient. 
Two well-known initial collaborators were Dejazmach Haile-Selassie Gugsa 
of Tigray and Ras Hailu Tekle-Haimanot of Gojjam, both rivals of Emperor 
Haile Selassie. Dejazmach Haile-Selassie, whose father was the grandson of 
Emperor Yohannes (who reigned from 1872-1889), foresaw regaining the 
throne of his great-grandfather with the support of the Italians. Thus he put his 
followers at the service of the Italians. Ras Hailu, son of Negus (King) Tekle 
Haimanot of Gojjam, who had been opposed to Emperor Haile Selassie’s rise to 
power in the 1920s, had also anticipated governing Gojjam without any 
imperial intervention if he collaborated with the Italians. Both received arms 
and money from the Italians for their services but not the power and prestige 
they had dreamt of. Some other low-ranking nobles also collaborated with the 
Italians, induced by similar expectations. However, once in power, ‘Mussolini 
ordered “No power to the rases”. Italy, he said, would not rule Ethiopia on a 
metayer basis by sharing power with the Ethiopian nobles.’43 Mussolini seemed 
to have rightly grasped the deeper feelings of the Ethiopian collaborators who 
had their own separate aspirations that would not fit in the Fascists’ policy. 
With the promise of reviving Muslim states like that of Harar and reinstating 
Oromo kingdoms like those of Abba Jifar and Abba Jobir Abdullah – kingdoms 
incorporated previously by Ethiopia – the Italians gained substantial 
collaboration from Muslims in the lowlands and Oromos in the south and 
eastern highlands. Abba Jobir, who was once imprisoned in Addis Ababa by the 
Ethiopian government for opposing the deployment of Amhara soldiers to 
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collect taxes in his region, formed an army of Oromo Muslims and joined the 
Italians to fight the Patriots. Later when he found out that the Italians would not 
let him acquire the autonomous power he aspired to, he began conniving with 
the British councillor who had an office in Gore.  
In all these major cases of collaboration, there was a feeling of victimization 
by the Emperor’s drive to centralize authority and reign over regional power 
holders that also claimed authority. However, although these acts of 
collaboration facilitated the objectives of the invaders to a limited extent, they 
were essentially acts through which the collaborators hoped to secure what they 
had lost under the reign of the Emperor. ‘Certainly they acted to protect their 
own interests, but these actions were not necessarily opportunistic. Instead, they 
reflected a long tradition of rivalry and tension between centre and periphery, 
particularly at times when the centre was perceived as weak or vulnerable.’44 
 
Intensified resistance and an attempt on Graziani’s life 
On 19 February 1937, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani together with his dignitaries 
and guests of honour were celebrating the birth of the Prince of Naples, in front 
of the Viceroy’s palace in Addis Ababa. Two young Ethiopians from Eritrea, 
Abraham Deboch, who worked for the Italian Political Office in Addis Ababa, 
and Moges Asgedom, a clerk in the municipal office, approached the podium 
and threw seven hand grenades, killing three Italian officers and wounding 52 
others. General Liotta, Commander of the Italian Air Force, lost his right eye 
and leg while Graziani, the main target of the attack, was wounded by some 300 
splinters. 
Moges and Abraham escaped to join the Patriots in Wolkait, while Tadelech 
Estifanos, Abraham’s wife, left a day earlier for the monastery of Debre 
Libanos. Meanwhile the city of Addis Ababa turned into an orgy of terror. 
Graziani ordered random retaliatory measures be carried out and Italian soldiers 
went out killing virtually anyone in sight, burning houses and churches, like St. 
George’s, and clubbing children to death. Not even the sick lying in hospital 
were spared. The terrible scenes prompted Mussolini into action, as he ‘forbade 
these draconian measures for fear of negative world public opinion’.45 The 
attack launched by Moges and Abraham ‘at the heart of the invaders’ gave the 
Patriots’ morale a boost and retaliatory measures taken by the invaders only 
further widened the existing gap between the Ethiopian people and the Italian 
occupiers. 
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After February 1937, a new mode of Patriot resistance started to grow in 
scope and popularity throughout the country. Yohannes Saomerjibashian, a 
young Ethiopian of Armenian descent, started an underground paper known as 
the Pillar of Ethiopian Light. Blatta Kidane-Mariam formed a clandestine 
movement of Ethiopian youth and worked closely with the women’s 
organization in resistance activities. Printed by Yohannes and distributed 
systematically by youth organized by Kidane-Mariam, leaflets calling for an 
uprising against the Fascists started appearing in the city’s public squares. The 
railway line linking Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti was frequently 
attacked. By October 1936, the Patriots had already ambushed an armoured 
train, escorted by a squadron of warplanes, that was secretly carrying A. 
Lessona, the Italian Minister of Colonies and C. Gigli, the Minister of Public 
Works. Such train ambushes now increased in frequency. The British author 
Evelyn Waugh, who also travelled from Djibouti to Addis Ababa via Harar by 
train during that year and managed to interview Graziani, later observed that 
‘there was a machine-gun section posted at the front of the train; another at the 
rear. From Awash to Addis the line was heavily guarded.’46 The resistance in 
central Ethiopia thus became widespread in numerous forms and proved 
tenacious. Patriot Haile-Mariam Mamo was well known for his hit-and-run 
tactics around Addis Ababa. In Gojjam, the professed shifta Belay Zelleke and 
his rival Hailu Belaw, although at times also raiding each other’s territory, 
inflicted heavy damage on stationary and mobile Italian troops. In Begemder, 
Yohannes Iyasu and Asfaw Bogale were fighting the well-equipped enemy on 
many fronts. A successful attack in Bellesa forced Governor O. Mezzetti to 
retreat to Gondar, the capital of the Begemder region, where he found further 
unrest.   
While resistance proliferated nationwide, the different groups of Patriots 
were, however, operating on their own, some in traditional ways (raiding, hit-
and-run attacks) and others employing modern tactics. There was no unified, 
central command structure. In most provinces, including Tigray, Gondar, 
Gojjam, Showa, Wollo, Arusi and Wollega, similar acts of resistance could be 
observed. Eritreans too were joining the resistance in large numbers. As early as 
January 1936, about 400 Eritreans abandoned the invaders on the Shire front 
alone, where the Italians had the upper hand, and joined the retreating Ras Imru. 
Some 600 Eritreans came to join Ras Desta at Adola on 20 February 1936 
(Seifu Abawaolla, cited in Salome).47 Patriots from Eritrea like Kegnazmach 
Andom Tesfatsion, Kegnazmach Assefa Bahitu, Kegnazmach Seleba Wolde-
Selassie and many others (see the list in Salome) joined the resistance 
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movement on all the major fronts and hundreds were killed fighting the 
Italians.48 This historical fact also refutes the idea entertained by some Eritrean 
writers that Eritreans were not involved in the Ethiopian resistance movement. 
On the economic front many Ethiopians seemed to boycott the Italian lire as 
currency. Especially in the countryside, people continued to use Maria Theresa 
thalers, the original Austrian silver dollar, for transactions although the Italians 
had declared the lire to be the unit of currency upon their arrival. However, the 
Italians had to pay Ethiopian labourers at the platinum mines at Yubdo in 
thalers because they would not accept lire. Furthermore, when the authorities 
forced the labourers to accept paper money (the lire), there was mass desertion. 
Several local markets almost ceased to exist as commerce went elsewhere.49 
Such crippling resistance inflated the already rising costs of Italian occupation 
and severely devalued the lire. A Maria Theresa thaler could be obtained from 
the Royal Mint in London for 6.50 lire in 1937 and sold for 13.50 lire in 
Ethiopia.50  
The spirit of the resistance echoed through some cities in Italy as well.51 
Ethiopians who were taken there either as prisoners or interpreters were 
expected to be moulded in Italian ideology and ways of thinking. Among the 
400 notables and their families who were deported to Italy through Massawa in 
the summer of 1937 was the young Zerai Derres, working as an aid. ‘Zerai 
Derres, an Eritrean interpreter of the exiled Rases, on 13 June 1938, in front of 
the monument of the fallen heroes of Dogali in Rome, pronounced words in 
favor of Haile Selassie. In an attempt to stop him, several persons were 
wounded.’52 Abdisa Agga (later a colonel), a suspected accomplice of Abraham 
Deboch and Moges Asgedom in their attempt to kill Graziani, was taken to 
Libya as a prisoner. When the German army was defeated in Libya, Abdisa 
Agga, together with other British, Greek, Yugoslav and Albanian prisoners, was 
transferred to a prison in Italy from which he later managed to escape. He then 
engaged in guerrilla activities in the northern mountains of Italy where he met 
Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav resistance leader. As Nega remarked, ‘Abdisa 
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fought the Fascists in their own land until he returned to Ethiopia after the 
liberation’.53 
In late 1937 Mussolini realized that resistance was increasing in Ethiopia 
despite Graziani’s appalling repression. He replaced Graziani at the end of 1937 
with Viceroy U. Amadeo, the Duke of Aosta, who he thought would take a 
more ‘pacifying approach’ as governor and would contain the fermenting 
Ethiopian rebellion. In an effort to try a different tactic, the new viceroy began 
to engage in dialogue with the rases and other rebel leaders, hoping to negotiate 
their surrender. He offered money, titles and posts in his administration and also 
employed the tactic of divide-and-rule among the independently acting rases 
and a few other leaders. In fact, some leaders like Dejazmach Gebrehiwet 
Michael, Dejazmach Amde Ali, Dejazmach Ayalew Birru, Dejazmach 
Habtemichael, the author Afework Gebreyesus, Mengesha Wube, and some 
low-ranking chiefs responded positively, which again shows that the 
Ethiopians’ response to Italian occupation and the opportunities of the new 
situation was neither uniform nor universal. But a majority remained defiant. 
This held for the Patriots, the Church, women’s organizations, most intellectuals 
and the youth, many of whom subsequently joined the resistance movement. 
Some of the Patriots made use of the negotiation scheme, appearing to 
collaborate with the occupiers but only to buy time until a more favourable 
moment to strike back. For instance, the famous Patriot Abebe Aregay 
negotiated his possible surrender with the Italians but historians generally 
interpret this episode as a mere diversion to obtain breathing space for his 
exhausted troops.54 Guerrilla bands, led by renowned fighters like Zewde 
Asfaw, Abebe Aregay and Mesfin Seleshi, continued to make the well-
entrenched Italians in Addis Ababa feel permanently uneasy. In addition, the 
provinces remained insecure for the invaders. Patriots Gerasu Duki on the 
Jimma road, Fitawrari Taffera on the Neqemte road, Gebre-Hiwet Meshesha in 
the Lemelimo Gorge, Tesfay Medebai in the Merebe Gorge and Belay Zelleke 
in the Nile Gorge, commanding from 500 to 3,000 armed Patriots, made rural 
Ethiopia continuingly hazardous for Italian movement. Only in the south and 
southwest was the situation more or less stable, and road-building programmes 
and administrative services could be set up. 
As the granting of titles, bribes and negotiations failed to bring the resistance 
under control, the commander-in-chief of the Italian forces at the time, General 
Ugo Cavallero convinced the Duke of Aosta ‘that the “Graziani method” would 
bring the desired result’.55 This meant a full-scale military campaign and 
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exercise of sheer terror, as well as better defence works. Cavallero built road 
connections between strategic spots linked with chains of forts – still a visible 
Italian legacy in Ethiopia today. From 1938 to mid-1939 Cavallero’s army was 
engaged in executing the ‘Graziani method’ in what seemed to be an endless 
war of terror and attrition.   
 
 
The end of resistance and post-war Ethiopia 
 
In 1940 Mussolini embarked on what was later to prove the most disastrous 
venture of his career. He signed a pact with Nazi Germany and entered the 
European War on 10 June. Britain and France, both accustomed to diplomatic 
rivalry with Italy in the colonial partition of East Africa, were now set to 
become the arch-enemies of Italy, as they were of her Axis partner Germany. 
This new alliance of world forces came as a salutary gift for Ethiopia. Emperor 
Haile Selassie, whose repeated cry for help in the five preceding years had been 
disregarded by the world powers and by the League of Nations, found support 
from this twist of events. Many types of assistance to the Ethiopian cause and to 
the Patriots began to flow in, not only from England where the Emperor was 
living in exile but also from the other Allied powers. Haile Selassie’s return to 
Ethiopia was synchronized with the British offensive56 that was planned to drive 
the Italians out of the region. 
The British organized the Emperor’s journey via Khartoum, Sudan, from 
where he would start mobilizing Patriots in exile and at the border, and advance 
into Ethiopia. When he arrived in Khartoum on 3 July 1940, he received 
messages of support from the prominent Patriot leaders in the field. Yet, he was 
not sure how the people he left with the Fascist Italians back in 1936 would 
receive him. Possible rebellions in Gojjam, the Ogaden and Eritrea and more 
seriously, the republican ideals of Takele Wolde-Hawariat and the dynamic 
intellectuals in the resistance were some of the threats that the Emperor needed 
to address. The Patriots’ resistance had created its own political momentum, 
with claims and implications for the post-war period in Ethiopia, with or 
without the Emperor. The role of the resistance in posing this kind of political 
challenge to a liberated Ethiopia is perhaps worthy of a separate study but it can 
be said that the ideals of just rebellion, social justice and people’s rights that  
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 Patriots at Debra Markos market after the Italian surrender 
Source: R. Pankhurst, ‘The Ethiopian Patriots and the Collapse of Italian Rule in
East Africa, 1940-41’, Ethiopia Observer, 12, 2 (1969), 114 
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emerged from the resistance were a development which Ethiopia, and 
specifically the new government, had to deal with. 
From June 1940, an intensive propaganda campaign on behalf of the 
Emperor attempted to improve the conditions for his return (led by the British 
journalist George Steer). On 30 January 1941, the day Haile Selassie crossed the 
border from Sudan on his way to Ethiopia accompanied by General Orde 
Wingate and several Patriots, he declared that there would be no retaliation 
against the Italians. This declaration was considered the official cessation of the 
resistance, although nobody was sure how the Italians were going to respond. 
Soon the Duke of Aosta and his army retired to the strategic pass of Amba 
Alagie in Tigray, leaving Addis Ababa to the Patriots, who were in the nearby 
mountains and inside the city, and to the British general, Alan Cunningham, 
who was pushing his way up from Kenya north to Addis Ababa. On 6 April 
1941, Addis Ababa was liberated and a month later, on 5 May 1941, Emperor 
Haile Selassie entered the city. His rule was restored and he remained on the 
throne for the next 33 years. 
Although detachments of the British army, combined with the forces of the 
Patriots, ended the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, this period left an impressive 
memory of indigenous Ethiopian resistance. At the time, it was realized how 
much the occupation had shaken traditional institutions and the myth of the 
divine Emperor (as was still written in the 1930 Ethiopian Constitution). Many 
also related their patriotic struggle to the war in Europe where the common 
enemies of the Axis had to be rooted out. What people vividly remember to this 
day is the horrific behaviour of the invaders on the one hand and the endurance 
and heroic struggle of the Patriots on the other. 
In the wake of their defeat and withdrawal from Ethiopia, the Italians were 
expecting the Ethiopians, who had suffered brutal oppression at their hands for 
five consecutive years, to take revenge. Resistance, after all, is a reaction to and 
a product of real or perceived injustice, and the Italian injustices and exercise of 
violence were seen as beyond acceptable limits. Such actions had no precedent 
in Ethiopia: the mustard-gas bombings, the mass executions, the arbitrary 
massacre of civilians, the wiping out of an educated class. Yet, with the 
Emperor’s declaration not to hurt or inflict damage on the Italians in retreat, for 
which he later received a letter of gratitude from President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt of the United States, the Ethiopians did not resort to the violent style 
of vengeance they had witnessed by the Italians since October 1935 (the Adua 
Syndrome). In these five years of occupation, the Ethiopians resisted 
aggression, injustice and violation of their rights as a sovereign nation. Once it 
was over, two factors mitigated their response and their anger to avenge. Firstly 
there was their traditional prudence based on a religious culture of tolerance and 
dignity, and in this respect there ís a difference in religious culture between 
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Ethiopians and Europeans. And secondly, the international political situation 
(i.e. pressure from the British and Americans) and the dependence of Ethiopia 
on foreign diplomatic and material assistance may have played a role in 
softening the Ethiopian response at a higher level. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The Italian invasion (1935) and occupation (1936-1941) of Ethiopia were 
conducted by a modern and strong European army that could not be matched by 
Ethiopia at the time. Conventional military theories and diplomatic manoeuvres 
were employed in extreme forms against an Ethiopian army that did not have 
even a working central command structure, let alone modern weaponry systems 
or diplomatic backing. The Italian invaders unleashed an unprecedented 
campaign of violent submission both from the ground as well as from the air, to 
which the Ethiopians had no defences and which caused huge loss of life. At the 
beginning of the occupation, the collapse of the Ethiopian army before 
Mussolini’s war machine followed by the flight of the Emperor into exile led 
many to believe that the fate of a long-independent nation was doomed. Any 
possible emergence of patriotic resistance also looked far-fetched. ‘Mussolini’s 
dream, one shared by the Italian people and constantly reiterated in the press, 
that millions of Italians would be able to find land and work in Ethiopia’57 then 
seemed to gain ground.  
But the Ethiopians were poised to fight back. The Italians controlled the 
major towns, yet they could in no way gain control over the vast Ethiopian 
countryside where resistance was gathering momentum. Despite Italian violence 
intended to force them into submission, the majority of Ethiopians drew upon 
their sense of freedom and pride, and were mentally prepared to resist the vastly 
superior forces that threatened their sovereign rights as an independent nation, 
and their historical identity, religion and culture. 
Ethiopians decided to resist even without the Emperor, who some said 
should have been there as a symbol of unity. Thus the formal Italian war of 
occupation was confronted with an informal, open-ended and community-based 
resistance. The traditional form of resistance, shiftinnet, had found a new terrain 
to spread to and a new enemy to counter, this time enjoying a much broader 
popular support. Unlike the old shiftinnet inspired by a rebellious noble or a few 
politically ambitious individuals, anti-Italian resistance drew upon all sectors of 
Ethiopian society: the peasantry, the nobility, the clergy, intellectuals, women 
and the youth alike. ‘From this point resistance was no longer an aristocratic 
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affair’ but in fact ‘serendipitous’, as Schaefer58 rightly observed – gifted with 
the ability to find novel ways of revolt and action. For the Italians, however, 
resistance was an act of violence by irrational outlaws or t’era-shiftas who 
deserved to be hunted down, flogged, publicly hanged or executed by firing 
squad in order to create a state of fear and submission. Despite the repression 
and atrocities against the resistance fighters, the Italians never achieved the 
desired result. 
While the resistance expanded in scope and tenacity, the Italian human and 
material costs were growing, and driving the Italians to a state of increased fury. 
Not only was the whole objective of their occupation thwarted but also ‘never in 
their quinquennium of rule did the fascists feel secure in Ethiopia, and their 
anxiety came to border on neurosis’.59 To the relief of Ethiopians, Italy entered 
the Second World War on the side of Germany, and the Allied forces began to 
pour in support to bolster the resistance movement in Ethiopia. After the Italians 
were defeated, resistance, which had become nationwide, came to an abrupt 
end.  
The five years of Italian occupation shook feudalist Ethiopia and the impact 
the occupation created in traditional Ethiopia was significant. As McClellan put 
it: ‘It was an event that swept away old myths and created opportunity for 
Ethiopians to re-examine the nature and meaning of their state. For Ethiopia, the 
war highlighted a need to move fully into the modern world’.60 The fact that 
Ethiopia had failed to repulse the predatory Italian invasion in itself proved to 
many that the country had a long way to go, among other things, in building a 
modern system of self-defence. But, given the whole purpose of the invasion 
and occupation, there was another aspect to what the ‘modern world’ 
constituted in the context of the Ethiopian conception as a free and sovereign 
nation that had to face unprovoked aggression. While the need to move into the 
modern world was deemed essential, there also emerged a rethinking of why 
and how the occupation was conducted and how resistance had been organized. 
In the first place, there was no doubt that it was basically Italy’s authoritarian, 
nationalistic and greedy colonial ambition that led to the invasion and 
occupation of Ethiopia. For most Ethiopians, the invasion and occupation were 
executed in the most barbaric and violent manner. The perception was that if 
this was the guise of the ‘modern world’, few Ethiopians would be attracted by 
it. Second, the essence of the resistance was to safeguard the independence, 
religious values and cultural identity of Ethiopia, all taking inspiration from the 
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domain of the past as heritage. In view of the violent ‘present’ defined by the 
Italians, the Ethiopians naturally oriented themselves to the past, i.e. all that 
defined their historical and cultural identity. In both cases, the raison d’être of 
the motivation for change was negative. Italy’s modernity can hardly be seen to 
have positively transformed Ethiopia’s traditional society. The only thing 
remaining and still referred to by Ethiopians is the ‘heritage’ of Italian road-
building. 
After 1941 Ethiopia moved towards modernity at its own pace within the 
contours of the old imperial order. The Patriots’ contribution to the freedom and 
independence of the country was highly valued, and many of their leaders were 
rewarded with public positions. However, the social and political aims of the 
resistance – ideals relating to social justice, equality and more openness in the 
political system – were not really followed up. Patriot leaders were also 
expected to be loyal to the Emperor again, and those who dissented or actively 
conspired against him were removed, and in some cases (like Belay Zelleke) 
executed. While the Emperor promulgated a new revised constitution in 1955, 
installed a parliament, allowed limited non-party elections, embarked on far-
reaching judicial reforms and developed the education system, the old property 
relations and the lack of democratic rights, such as a free press, free elections 
and political parties, remained unaddressed. In this respect, the Patriots’ 
programme was not realized. 
 
 
